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Note
Sticks, Carrots, Donkey Votes, and True
Choice: A Rationale for Abolishing
Compulsory Voting in Australia
Katherine M. Swenson*
-Very nice. But do me a favor-read this for me.
-"It doesn't matter who you vote for. Make sure you vote."
-I like the sentiment, but the thing is I think it does matter who you vote for.'
In 1992, the Commonwealth of Australia prosecuted an
Aborigine lawyer named Michael Mansell for failing to comply
with a compulsory voting law.2 He was ordered to pay a fine or
face three days in prison.3 Outside the courthouse, Mansell
proclaimed that he would not pay the fine because he was "a
member of the aboriginal nation and not the Australian one."4
In 1999, Melissa Manson of Victoria, Australia, was jailed for
contempt of court after refusing "on principle" to pay fines
punishing her failure to vote in two federal elections.5 "[T]here
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., University of
Minnesota, 2004. I would like to thank my family and friends for their constant
support, and the journal staff and editors for their time, attention, and insight.
1. The West Wing: Game On (NBC television broadcast Oct. 30, 2002),
http://www.westwingtranscripts.com/search.php?flag=getTranscript&id=73
(emphasis added).
2. Lisa Hill, Democratic Assistance: A Compulsory Voting Template 8 (2002),
available at http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/2002/hill.pdf; Aborigine Refuses to
Vote in "White" Elections, REUTERS NEWS, July 30, 1992, available at LEXISNEXIS,
Library Meganw, File Reunws.
3. Aborigine Refuses to Vote in "White" Elections, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. HILL, supra note 2, at 18 n.17.
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were no candidates worth voting for," she explained. 6 In May
2004, Bill Smithies was arrested for failure to pay a non-voting
fine of $461.7  These sanctions can be imposed in the
Commonwealth of Australia because eligible citizens have a
legal duty to vote.8
This Note argues that voluntary voting should be restored
to Australia. Part I outlines compulsory voting in an
international context and discusses the Australian law bearing
on the duty to vote. Part II analyzes whether compulsory voting
is incompatible with broad theories of democracy, whether
political expression involved in non-voting should be allowed,
and the possible consequences of abolishing compulsory voting
in Australia. This Note concludes that Australia's compulsory
voting law is incompatible with democracy because it stifles the
expression of political dissent. Furthermore, the current law
punishes only those who fail to attend the polls, not those who
intentionally spoil their ballot or cast a blank one. Though voter
turnout likely will decrease in the wake of abolishing
compulsory voting in Australia, restoring voluntary voting will
strengthen democracy by allowing voters to make a true choice
on Election Day.
I. A PRIMER ON COMPULSORY VOTING AND
AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL LAW
A. COMPULSORY VOTING WORLDWIDE
The act of voting is often hailed as the cornerstone of
political participation in a democracy.9 After all, "democracy"
6. Id.
7. Counterpoint: Compulsory Voting (Australian Broadcasting Corporation
radio broadcast May 24, 2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/m/talks/
counterpoint/stories/sll17921.htm. The fine levied against Smithies for not voting
was "the largest fine ever imposed on a[n Australian] non-voter." Id. All references
to dollars in this Note refer to Australian dollars.
8. Compulsory voting applies to elections at the national, state, territorial,
and local levels in Australia. Legal Information Access Center, Compulsory
Enrolment and Voting, http'//www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/liac/hot-topic/hottopic/
2001]144.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007). The exceptions are South Australia,
Western Australia, and Tasmania, which have voluntary voting for local elections.
Id.; see MARK N. FRANKLIN, VOTER TURNOUT AND THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL
COMPETITION IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES SINCE 1945, at 231 (2004).
9. See, e.g., BEDE HARRIS, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR AUSTRALIA 36 (2002);
PENN KIMBALL, THE DISCONNECTED 289 (1972); Alan Wertheimer, In Defense of
526 [Vol. 16:2
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means "rule by the people,"10 and voting is how the people
choose their leaders." Thirty-two countries have compulsory
voting laws12 that create a legal duty to vote and, in some cases,
establish penalties for failure to do so. 13 Penalties for failure to
meet this duty range from having to provide a legitimate reason
for not voting, to paying a fine, to being culled from the voting
rolls, to being imprisoned. 14 Several countries that once utilized
compulsory voting (including Italy, the Netherlands, and
Venezuela) no longer have compulsory voting laws, or have
ceased to enforce them. 5
Bolstering voter turnout is a major rationale for instituting
compulsory voting laws. 16 The reasoning is that low voter
turnouts undermine the legitimacy of a democratic government,
while large voter turnouts enhance it.'" The greater the
Compulsory Voting, in 16 PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 276, 277 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1975).
10. "Democracy" comes from the Greek dimokratia: dimos (the people) and
kratein (to rule). WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE
375 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d ed. 1970); see also President Abraham Lincoln, The
Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?doc=36&page=transcript (referring to democracy as "government of the
people, by the people, for the people").
11. See JOHN HIRST, AUSTRALIA'S DEMOCRACY: A SHORT HISTORY 327 (2002)
(stating that "compulsory voting relates to . . .how governments themselves are
created").
12. See Memorandum from Tim Evans, Dir., Elections Sys. & Policy, Austl.
Electoral Comm'n, Compulsory Voting in Australia, at 6 (Jan. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.aec.gov.auLcontent(What/voting/compulsory-voting.pdf (stating that
nineteen of the thirty-two countries with such laws enforce them, and that nearly
ten percent of the world's population is governed by such laws).
13. See Sean Matsler, Note, Compulsory Voting in America, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
953, 962-67 (2003).
14. See Maria Gratschew, Programme Officer, International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Compulsory Voting (Apr. 2001),
http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory-voting.cfm. The level of enforcement varies, and
imprisonment is usually due to failure to pay a fine imposed by a court of law. Id.
15. See id.; Matsler, supra note 13, at 967.
16. See Gratschew, supra note 14. Worldwide, participation rates in elections
have dropped. See Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved
Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1997) ("The problem of inequality can be solved
by institutional mechanisms that maximize turnout. One option is the combination
of voter-friendly registration rules .... The other option, which can maximize
turnout by itself, is compulsory voting."). See generally FRANKLIN, supra note 8. In
Australia, turnout for the federal Senate election, reported by total votes as a
percentage of enrolled voters, jumped from 57.95% in 1922 to 91.31% in 1925 with
the establishment of compulsory voting. Australian Electoral Commission, Voter
Turnout 1901-Present, http://www.aec.gov.au/-content/What/voting/turnout/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
17. See, e.g., Don Aitkin & Michael Kahan, Australia: Class Politics in the New
World, in ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK 437, 445-49 (Richard
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percentage of the populace that votes, the "more accurately [the
government reflects] the 'will of the electorate."' 8 If making
sure that each person gets only one vote sets a ceiling on
political participation, compulsory voting can be seen as
establishing a floor. I 9 Such a ceiling and floor together
minimize disparities in voter participation. 20 Decisions are
made by those who show up; if everyone shows up, then the
decision is truly democratic. 2' The institution of compulsory
voting is associated with increases in the number of votes cast,
as well as increases in blank ballots as a proportion of the
whole.22 In the Commonwealth of Australia, voter turnout
usually reaches ninety-five percent. 23 However, compulsory
voting may not be the only factor driving this high turnout.
Over several generations, voting in Australia appears to have
become not only a legal norm, but a social norm as well. 24
Additionally, Australia has mandatory voter registration, which
is also associated with increased voter turnout.25
Another rationale for compulsory voting is that casting a
ballot is a duty that the State can compel its citizens to fulfill,
Rose ed., 1974); KIMBALL, supra note 9, at 289; Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without
Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2137 (1996); Matsler, supra note 13, at 965. But see
Robert W. Jackman, Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial
Democracies, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405, 418 (1987) (summarizing the argument that
low voter turnout might "reflect[] satisfaction with the political status quo and is
therefore a good thing").
18. Australian Electoral Commission, Compulsory Voting,
http://www.aec.gov.au/-content/What/voting/compulsory voting.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2007).
19. SIDNEY VERBA, NORMAN H. NIE & JAE-ON KIM, PARTICIPATION AND
POLITICAL EQUALITY: A SEVEN-NATION COMPARISON 6-8 (1978).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Wertheimer, supra note 9, at 278.
23. Paul Tait, Howard's Government Favoured as Australians Vote, REUTERS
NEWS, Oct. 8, 2004, available at LEXISNEXIS, Library Meganw, File Reunws. One
of the rationales for instituting compulsory voting in Australia was to "overcome...
a decreasing turnout." DEAN JAENSCH & MAX TEICHMANN, THE MACMILLAN
DICTIONARY OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICS 51 (3d ed. 1998).
24. See John McCarthy, General Principles of Australian Electoral Law, 19
AUSTL. B. REV. 1, 5 (2000), available at 2000 ABR LEXIS 2; Hasen, supra note 17, at
2137 (discussing norm theory and voting).
25. Australia has both mandatory voter registration and compulsory voting;
some countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) have the former but not the latter. See
Sian Clare, Compulsory Voting Call, PRESS ASS'N (United Kingdom), Nov. 27, 2001.
For an argument that voter registration laws have had a strong negative effect on
U.S. voter turnout, see Jason P. W. Halperin, Note, A Winner at the Polls: A
Proposal for Mandatory Voter Registration, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 69
(2000).
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similar to paying taxes, serving on a jury, sending children to
school, or registering for military service. 26 Because elections
provide leaders who distribute benefits to their constituents, 27
elections are a public good; citizens who do not vote are
considered "free riders."28  Free riders reap the benefits of
elections without participating, and they also fail to do their
part in providing the public good to others.29
A third rationale for compulsory voting is the effect it has
on political parties and their role in the electoral system.
Compulsory voting lessens the part money plays in elections.
30
It eliminates the need for "get out the vote" movements, which
are often funded by political parties.31 In theory, more money
and time can then be spent focusing on issues instead of
convincing constituents to attend the polls. 32 Furthermore,
compulsory voting may discourage candidates from using attack
advertisements.33 In Australia, compulsory voting benefits the
two major parties by reducing the uncertainty of voter turnout;
this yields a large amount of safe seats and allows parties to
focus on wooing undecided voters.3
4
26. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, COMPULSORY VOTING 12, 33 (1955); Lijphart,
supra note 16, at 11.
27. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36-37 (1957).
28. See Ruy A. TEIXEIRA, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE: TURNOUT DECLINE IN
THE UNITED STATES 1960-1984, at 5 (1987) ("Although it is true that the outcome of
an election may have a substantial impact on a person's life, the individual citizen
does not have to participate in the election to obtain these benefits. They are
available to everyone, voter and nonvoter alike."(citation omitted)); Lijphart, supra
note 16,-at 11; Wertheimer, supra note 9, at 280.
29. See Wertheimer, supra note 9, at 285. Wertheimer argued that "it may be
preferable to tolerate this injustice if the alternative is to introduce unnecessary
legal coercion, especially when those who do take on the burden of providing the
public good do not seem to mind doing so." Id.
30. See Lijphart, supra note 16, at 10.
31. See, e.g., JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 51.
32. See BILL BRUGGER & DEAN JAENSCH, AUSTRALIAN POLITICS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 203 (1985) (pointing out that political parties "have been relieved of the
task of 'getting out the vote', and have been able to concentrate on the second
problem-that of getting the vote to them"); Memorandum from Tim Evans, supra
note 12, at 13.
33. Lijphart argued that such advertising becomes moot under compulsory
voting because it works by "selectively depressing turnout among those not likely to
vote for the attacker." Lijphart, supra note 16, at 10 (discussing the findings in
STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How ATTACK ADS
SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995)).
34. See BRUGGER & JAENSCH, supra note 32, at 203 ("Assured of the votes of
their committed followers, parties seek support among the 'swinging' voters.");
Counterpoint: Compulsory Voting, supra note 7 (containing a statement by Sen. Nick
Minchin that "if... everybody is going to vote because they're forced to vote, you
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B. AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL LAW
1. The Right to Vote?
a. Constitutional Provisions and "Choice"
The Australian Constitution 35 does not directly bestow a
"right to vote," although the document does mention voting.36
Section 41 prohibits the Commonwealth from preventing voting
by any "adult person who has or acquires a right to vote at
elections."37 Sections 7 and 24 provide that the senators and
representatives, respectively, shall be "directly chosen by the
people."38 The choice referred to in Sections 7 and 24 has been
found to imply a "freedom of communication between the people
concerning political or government matters which enables the
people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors."39 The
choice must be "a true choice,"40 but Parliament has the power
"to determine how that 'choice' is to be made, including whether
attendance to make such a 'choice' is compulsory."41
b. Implied Freedom of Political Communication
Established in Australian Capital Television Proprietary
concentrate your communications on the undecided voters in a few swinging seats").
35. COMMONWEALTH AusTL. CONST. AcT.
36. See, e.g., Ann Twomey, The Federal Constitutional Right to Vote in
Australia, 28 FED. L. REV. 125, 125 (2000) (explaining that "the right to vote for
those who govern is not entrenched in the Commonwealth Constitution").
37. COMMONWEALTH AuSTL. CONST. ACT § 41; see also GEORGE WILLIAMS,
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 96 (1999) (noting that
Section 41 "is worded as a restriction [that] does not vest any individual
entitlement" and "is the closest that the Constitution comes to expressly conferring a
right to vote in federal elections," though it does not do so directly).
38. COMMONWEALTH AuSTL. CONST. ACT § 7 ("The Senate shall be composed of
senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of the State, voting ... as one
electorate." (emphasis added)); id. § 24 ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth ... 
(emphasis added)).
39. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 560. The choice
referred to would be infringed, for example, by a law stating that only a single
candidate could appear on a ballot. WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 159.
40. Austl. Capital Television Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177
C.L.R. 106, 187.
41. WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 161; see Langer v. Commonwealth (1996) 186
C.L.R. 302, 340.
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Ltd. v. Commonwealth42 and Nationwide News Proprietary Ltd.
v. Wills,4 3 the implied freedom of political communication has
been narrowly construed by the High Court.4 4 The implied
freedom is a negative right.45 The High Court in Levy v. Victoria
contrasted the Australian Constitution with that of the United
States, stating that the former does not "create rights of
communication."46  Australia's implied freedom of political
communication provides "freedom from laws" rather than "a
freedom to communicate." 47 Furthermore, Sections 7 and 24 "do
not confer personal rights on individuals;" the emphasis is on
what the government may not do.48 The freedom is not absolute,
but "is limited to what is necessary for the effective operation of
that system of representation and responsible government
provided for by the Constitution."49
42. Austl. Capital Television, 177 C.L.R. at 227 ("[T]he proper conclusion to be
drawn from the terms of sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution is that the people of
Australia have constitutional rights of freedom of participation, association and
communication in relation to federal elections.").
43. Nationwide News Proprietary Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1, 72-73
("[Tihere is to be discerned in the doctrine of representative government which the
Constitution incorporates an implication of freedom of communication of information
and opinions about matters relating to the government of the Commonwealth.").
44. This freedom should not be confused with a broader concept of freedom of
expression. Rather, it is a "highly specific freedom to engage in communication
about political matters. The right thus does not extend to freedom of artistic
expression or to communication in relation to anything other than the political."
HARRIS, supra note 9, at 35.
45. See Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (1994) 182 C.L.R. 272, 327 ("The implication
is negative in nature: it invalidates laws and consequently creates an area of
immunity from legal control, particularly from legislative control.").
46. Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189 C.L.R. 579, 622; see, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (declaring voting to be a fundamental right);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (stating that the "right to vote freely for
the candidate of one's choice is of-the essence of a democratic society"); Dixon v. Md.
Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
freedom of choice in an election "includes the right to say that no candidate is
acceptable"). But see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (finding that
states may ban write-in voting).
47. Levy, 189 C.L.R. at 622.
48. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 560. But see Dan
Meagher, What Is 'Political Communication'? The Rationale and Scope of the
Implied Freedom of Political Communication, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 438, 450 (2004)
(arguing that "a broader range of communicative experiences and opportunities
must be accorded constitutional protection before" the act of voting "can be said to be
meaningful"); Adrienne Stone, Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of
the Freedom of Political Communication, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 374, 398 (2001)
(stating the possibility that "the freedom of political communication could .
require[] some protection of personal autonomy").
49. Lange, 189 C.L.R. at 561.
2007]
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In Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., the High Court
articulated a two-part test to determine whether a law
impermissibly infringes upon the implied freedom.50 The test is
as follows: first, "the object of the law [must be] . . . compatible
with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system
of representative and responsible government ... second[, ...
the law [must be] . . . reasonably appropriate and adapted to
achieving that legitimate object or end."51  Despite these
limitations, "[tihe freedom to receive and disseminate
information concerning government and political matters is not
confined to election periods."52 In Levy, the High Court applied
the Lange test and, while sustaining the regulation in question,
acknowledged that the implied freedom of political
communication may extend to political communication in the
form of symbolic conduct.53
c. Other Implied Constitutional Principles
Another relevant Constitutional principle that bears on
voting is the implied principle of representative democracy. 54 As
discussed above, there is no explicit right to vote in the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia.55 While it is
possible that an implied right to vote may be found in the
Constitutional requirement that members of the commonwealth
50. Id.
51. Id. at 561-62. However, "[t]he fine line drawn between a legitimate and
illegitimate burden must inevitably be a value-laden process. Hence the judges
when they apply the 'reasonably appropriate and adapted' test may not necessarily
reach the same conclusion." H.P. Lee, The 'Reasonably Appropriate and Adapted'
Test and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication, in LAW AND
GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA 59, 75 (Matthew Groves ed., 2005).
52. Lange, 189 C.L.R. at 520.
53. See Levy, 189 C.L.R. at 579; see also HARRIS, supra note 9, at 35-36;
WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 193. For a discussion on voting as expressive conduct,
see generally Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330 (1993).
See also DOWNS, supra note 27, at 119 (explaining that abstention can be a rational
strategy for extremist voters "willing to let the worse party win today in order to
keep the better party from moving toward the center, so that in future elections it
will be closer to them"); cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (finding
that license plate with motto "Live Free or Die" compelled petitioners to express an
idea they found objectionable); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968)
(concluding that government can punish burning of draft card, even when done as a
political statement); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that compelled flag salute is unconstitutional).
54. See McGinty v. Western Australia (1996) 186 C.L.R. 140, 198; Theophanous
v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 121.
55. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
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Parliament be directly chosen by the people at periodic
elections,5 6 this issue is "moot so long as universal adult suffrage
is conferred by the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1918."57
2. The Duty to Vote
a. What Exactly Does the Commonwealth Electoral Act
Require?
Compulsory voting was first adopted at the Commonwealth
level in 1925, though it had been instituted in Queensland
elections ten years earlier.5 8 Section 245 of the Commonwealth
Electoral Act (CEA) governs compulsory voting, giving voters
"the duty . . . to vote at each election," 59 and making failure "to
vote at an election without a valid and sufficient reason" an
offense. 60 Failure to vote "involves a failure to attend [the polls],
accept the ballot paper and having marked it, to put it in the
ballot box. Of course there is no offence committed by not
marking the ballot paper in such a fashion that the elector's
vote is in law a valid vote."61 It is impossible to enforce the
casting of a valid vote because ballots are to be marked in
private.62
b. What Are "Valid and Sufficient" Reasons?
Nowhere are all "valid and sufficient" reasons for failure to
56. See COMMONWEALTH AUSTL. CONST. ACT §§ 7, 24; see also supra Part
I.B.i.a.
57. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 37.
58. See James Allan, Paying for the Comfort of Dogma, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 63,
65 n.8 (2003). The first nine federal elections were held under a system of voluntary
voting. See Memorandum from Tim Evans, supra note 12, at 5.
59. Commonwealth Electoral Act,1918, § 245(1) (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.sf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB.
60. Id. § 245(5)(b).
61. Faderson v. Bridger (1971) 126 C.L.R. 271, 272. Under this line of
reasoning, handing in a blank ballot (i.e., not marking it at all) would not be an
offense. No Australian court has held that the ballot paper must be marked. See
JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 51; McCarthy, supra note 24, at 15.
62. See Commonwealth Electoral Act,1918, § 233 (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/LegislationActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB. In fact, Australia was the
first country to introduce the secret ballot, starting in the 1850s. See, e.g., JAENSCH
& TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 16. As this practice spread throughout the world, it
was often referred to as "the Australian Ballot." Id.
20071
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vote enumerated. One such reason is set forth in the CEA: a
voter is allowed to abstain from voting if he or she "believes it to
be part of his or her religious duty" to do so. 63 Failure to vote
because one's chosen political party's candidates are not on the
ballot is not a "valid and sufficient reason,"64 nor is it a valid
excuse that one finds all candidates objectionable. 65  The
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) list of guidelines used
to evaluate each claim is confidential, 66 but AEC publications
hint that "it would be unlikely, for example ... [to] impose a fine
for not voting on the elderly and frail, women in late pregnancy,
or the intellectually disabled."67 Enrolled voters who do not
attend the polls are notified by the AEC, setting the
enforcement process of the compulsory law in motion.68
Australia also has a system of preferential voting,69 which
requires voters to rank Senate and House candidates on the
63. Commonwealth Electoral Act,1918, § 245(14) (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationi.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB. Section 116 of Australia's
Constitution protects the freedom of religion, but it also "protect[s] the right of a
man to have no religion." Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Commonwealth
(1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 123. The State cannot "impose any religious observance"; it
must tolerate the absence of religion. Id.
64. Judd v. McKeon (1926) 38 C.L.R. 380, 384 (dismissing appellant's reason
for his failure to vote as "no more than the expression of an objection to the social
order of the community in which he lives").
65. Faderson, 126 C.L.R. at 273 ("To face the voter with a list of names of
persons, none of whom he may like or really want to represent him and ask him to
indicate a preference amongst them does not present him with a task that he cannot
perform.").
66. Legal Information Access Center, supra note 8.
67. Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Backgrounder No. 17, at 3
(Aug. 2004), available at http://www.aec.gov.au/_content/How/backgrounders/17/
EB_17 Compulsory-Voting.pdf.
68. The initial notice requests an explanation of the apparent failure to vote, or
payment of a twenty-dollar fine. See Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, §
245(5)(c)(iii) (Austl.), http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/begislation/
ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgmentattachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA25724900
11A9AB. Failure to vote is a strict liability offense unless the voter has a valid and
sufficient reason for the failure. Id. § 245(15A)-(15B). This penalty increases to
fifty dollars should the voter take her case to court and lose. Id. § 245(15). Making
a false or misleading statement in response to such a penalty statement is also
punishable by a fifty-dollar fine. Id. § 245(15C). Court costs may also be assessed.
See Australian Electoral Commission, Voting Within Australia: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.aec.gov.au/_content/whatvoting/faq-general.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2007).
69. Preferential voting is also called "alternative voting." Richard Rose,
Elections and Electoral Systems: Choices and Alternatives, in DEMOCRACY &
ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 20, 32
(Vernon Bogdanor & David Butler eds., 1983).
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ballot.70 Where there are only two candidates, a voter is allowed
to leave one box blank; where more than two candidates are on
the ballot, a voter must fill each box with a number indicating
preference, without repetition ("1" for the most preferred
candidate, "2" for the next, and so on).7' Write-in candidates are
not accepted. 72
Ballots that are left blank or filled out improperly are
designated as "informal" or "invalid."73 It is estimated that
about five percent of ballots are informal, whether by mistake or
design.74
Overwhelmingly, those who fail to vote in Australia are not
penalized. The 1993 federal elections saw a nationwide average
turnout of 96.22% and 95.75% of enrolled voters for the Senate
and House races, respectively. 75  The non-voters numbered
70. Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, §§ 239-40 (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB (stating that in both House
and Senate elections, voters must "writ[e] the number 1 in the square opposite the
name of the candidate for whom the person votes as his or her first preference; and.
. . writ[e] the numbers 2, 3, 4 (and so on, as the case requires) in the squares
opposite the names of all the remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of the
person's preference for them"). Langer v. Commonwealth, (1996) 186 C.L.R. 302,
321, addressed an ambiguity in a previous version of the law, which did not
explicitly prohibit a voter from ranking one or more candidates equally (e.g., "1," "2,"
"3," "3"). Preferential voting works in the following way:
If the most popular candidate has achieved an absolute majority (at least
one more than 50 per cent) then he or she is declared elected. If no
candidate has an absolute majority, the candidate with the fewest first
preference votes is excluded from the count, and his votes are distributed
among the remaining candidates according to second preferences. The
process continues, with the least supported candidates being excluded and
the next available preferences distributed until one candidate does achieve
an absolute majority.
JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 161.
71. See Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, §§ 239-40 (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA25724900llA9AB.
72. See id. § 162 ("No person shall be capable of being elected as a Senator or a
Member of the House of Representatives unless duly nominated.").
73. See JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 106; Legal Information
Access Center, supra note 8.
74. See JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 106. In the 2004 federal
election, 5.2% of ballots nationwide for the House were informal. Manuel Alvarez-
Rivera, Federal Elections in Australia: House of Representatives Results Lookup,
Election Resources on the Internet, http://www.electionresources.org/au/
house.phpelection=2004 (last visited Nov. 15, 2006). In the same election, 3.8% of
ballots for the Senate were informal. Id.
75. Australian Electoral Commission, 1993 Federal Election Voter Turnout by
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around half a million, 94% of whom gave acceptable reasons for
their failures to vote; 23,320 voters immediately paid the
twenty-dollar penalty, while 4,412 voters went to court.76 Of
these half-million non-voters, 41 people were jailed.77 For the
past 80 years, Australian voters have faced this system of
penalties if they fail to vote. This Note now turns to an analysis
of the arguments for and against mandatory voting, and finds
that Australia should restore voluntary voting.
II. VOLUNTARY VOTING WILL STRENGTHEN
DEMOCRACY
A. COMPULSORY VOTING IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRACY
Although compulsory voting would seem to bolster "the
democratic ideals of participation and equality," compelling a
person to cast a ballot is antithetical to the democratic value of
individual freedom.78 Indeed, Australia's "freedom of political
expression" rings rather hollowly when the right to make a
choice does not include the right not to make that choice. 79 The
late Frederick Jonas Dreyfus defined the word "vote" as "a
sacred offering of patriotic service at the altar of one's
country."80 Therefore, he argued, compulsion causes it to "lose]
all sanctity and become[] valueless."8' There certainly is a
Division, http://www.aec.gov.au/ content/What/voting/turnout/1993.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2007).
76. See TOM WATSON & MARK TAMI, POLICY REPORT NO. 50, VOTES FOR ALL:
COMPULSORY PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS 8 (2000). It is not known how many of
these non-voters were convicted. Id.
77. See HIRST, AUSTRALIA'S DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at 321.
78. See Lijphart, supra note 16, at 11; Australian Electoral Commission,
Compulsory Voting, supra note 18.
79. See KIMBALL, supra note 9, at 289-90 ("The right not to take part in a
selection process offering no acceptable choice is a precious part of democracy.");
Anne Twomey, Free to Choose or Compelled to Lie?: The Rights of Voters after
Langer v the Commonwealth, 24 FED. L. REv. 201, 214-15 (1996); see also supra
Part I.B.i.a.
80. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting Abraham's interview with Dreyfus).
Abraham notes that the word "vote" comes from the Latin votum. Id. The word
"vow" shares that same Latin root word, and its definition as "a solemn promise or
pledge ... dedicating oneself to an act, service, or way of life" illuminates Dreyfus's
concept of a civic offering. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 10,
at 1594.
81. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting Abraham's interview with Dreyfus).
But see Hasen, supra note 17, at 2135 (relating practice of election officials forcibly
rounding up Athenian citizens in the agora).
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tension between the idea that citizens choose to have a
democratic government, and the idea that they must cast a vote.
Several authors have compared compulsory voting to "forcing a
man to be free."8 2 This cuts to the heart of the conflict: once
people stop choosing democracy of their own free will, and are
forced to choose it, we are no longer talking about rule by the
people.8 3
1. Distinguishing Voting from Other Obligations
Under Australian electoral law, voting is a legal duty of
every eligible voter.84 Therefore, part of examining whether
compulsory voting should be abolished involves distinguishing
the duty to vote from other civic duties that a democratic state
often compels, including military service, education, taxation,
and jury service.8 5 There are various arguments distinguishing
these duties from voting; for example, military service might be
considered more necessary than the franchise to the existence of
a state.8 6 The best argument regarding this question of civic
duty is an overarching one: all of the various obligations
discussed above are secondary to voting. Voting is inextricably
linked to the creation of government by citizens;8 7 it is what
82. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 33; see also Wertheimer, supra note 9,
at 278. These sources paraphrase Jean Jacques Rousseau's famous quote that "the
social compact.., tacitly includes the undertaking... that whoever refuses to obey
the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing
less than that he will be forced to be free . . . ."). JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The
Social Contract: Or Principles of Political Right, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES 177 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman's Library 1973) (1762), available at
http://www.constitution.orgijjr/socon0.htm#007.
83. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
84. See supra Part I.B.ii.
85. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 33; see also supra text accompanying note
26.
86. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 13-15 ("A large-scale turnout at the
polls is eminently desirably, but not a priori mandatory for the life and death of a
government. Taxation is! . . . Military service is a necessity to the very physical
existence of the state; voting, although eminently desirable, is not of a similar
necessity.").
87. See John Hirst, Senate Occasional Lecture: The Distinctiveness of
Australian Democracy 3 (Sept. 10, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/occa-lect/transcripts/100904.pdf) ("Of course
governments compel citizens, but compulsory voting relates to another issue
altogether: how are governments themselves created. According to liberal
principles, citizens create governments; governments don't force people to be
citizens."); see also HIRST, AUSTRALIA'S DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at 321, 327.
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"makes all other political rights significant."88 It is the bedrock
upon which a government's decisions to compel its citizens to
serve in the military, pay taxes, sit on a jury, or send their
children to school depend.8 9
2. Voting as Expression
Voting is a form of expression.90 Australia has no general
right to freedom of expression, 91 but even the narrowly-
construed implied freedom of political expression encompasses
how a voter marks her ballot.92 A vote can express duty toward
the community;93 support for a cause, party, or candidate;94 or a
communication of one's perceptions, desires, judgments, and
beliefs.95 Casting a ballot, then, is a form of political expression.
But what-if anything-does non-voting express?
Before examining the answer to that question, it is worth
noting the different ways in which one is considered to have
failed to cast a formal (valid) vote in Australia. The first way is
not to attend the polls at all. The second way is to cast an
informal ballot, which is simply a ballot that is (by design or
accident) left blank or completed in such a way as to be
invalid.96 An informal ballot may be the result of a voter
88. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE
3 (1988).
89. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (stating that "the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights"); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (hailing voting as "a fundamental political
right, because preservative of all rights").
90. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 22; Winkler, supra note 53, at 331; cf.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 42
(1948) (stating that voting is a form of"speech-action").
91. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 9, at 35 (describing the freedom as "highly
specific" and limited to "communication about political matters"); see also supra Part
I.B.i.b.
92. See supra note 46.
93. See TEIXEIRA, supra note 28, at 6.
94. See id.; Winkler, supra note 53, at 334.
95. See Winkler, supra note 53, at 333-35. Winkler argued that expressive
voting has two roles: (1) a means of communication between the voter and others,
and (2) a means of "exertling] and shap[ing] one's identity without any
corresponding desire to convey messages." Id. at 333, 339.
96. In Judd v. McKeon, the High Court hinted that it would likely uphold a
hypothetical law allowing for the prosecution of a voter who intentionally casts an
informal vote, because such a voter would be refusing to make a choice. Judd v.
McKeon (1926) 38 C.L.R. 380, 383. The court stated:
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intending to cast a formal vote and making a mistake, or it may
be the result of a voter intentionally spoiling or leaving his
ballot blank.97 However, only failure to attend the polls can be
punished by law, because it is impossible to determine who casts
an informal ballot.98
3. Non-Voting and Political Expression
There are many expressive possibilities behind the failure
to cast a formal vote. One type of situation discloses the
possibility of non-voting as being expressive in the manner
discussed above: the voter made an honest mistake, but
intended to cast a formal vote in accordance with the law.99
However, voters who leave their ballots blank, intentionally
spoil them, or do not attend the polls arguably are expressing
themselves through their failures to cast a formal vote.100
One possible explanation is that voters are apathetic toward
their civic duty-they do not feel that casting a formal vote is
worth the effort, so they do not attend the polls, or they turn in
a blank ballot. 1 1 Expression of apathy might also include a
In common parlance "to choose" means no more than to make a selection
between different things or alternatives submitted, to take by preference
out of all that are available. As an illustration of the meaning of the
corresponding noun "choice" the Oxford Dictionary quotes the phrase "I
have given thee thy choice of the manner in which thou wilt die," and this
use of the word seems to exclude the idea that a right of choice can only be
said to be given when one or other of the alternatives submitted is desired
by the person who is to exercise the right, or, in other words, to choose
between them.
Id. But see Twomey, Free to Choose or Compelled to Lie?, supra note 79, at 214-15
(pointing out that "a number of judges have concluded that . . . voters may still
choose to cast an informal ballot"). Langer did not reach the question of whether it
is an offense to vote informally. Id. at 210.
97. There is rarely (if ever) a "none of the above" option on an Australian ballot.
See Wertheimer, supra note 9, at 279.
98. See Memorandum from Tim Evans, supra note 12, at 4.
99. A voter might make such a mistake by writing "1, 2, 3, 3, 4" instead of "1, 2,
3, 4, 5."
100. It should be noted that some voters who fail to vote fall under the "valid
and sufficient reason" exception. See supra Part I.B.ii.b. A voter who has a car
accident on her way to the polls, for example, is not expressing anything through her
failure to vote. See Jeffrey A. Blomberg, Note, Protecting the Right Not to Vote from
Voter Purge Statutes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1995) ("Willful abstention
could result from ... factors.., beyond the voter's control.").
101. See DOWNS, supra note 27, at 260 ("[Elvery rational man decides whether
to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the returns outweigh the costs, he
votes; if not, he abstains."). This idea of apathy is also described in terms of inertia
or alienation. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 22; Blomberg, supra note 100, at
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voter's decision that some other task, such as working, was more
important than casting a vote. Another possible reason behind
abstention is that a voter has no preference for any candidate or
does not, feel adequately informed to make a choice. For
example, a voter may deem all of the candidates undeserving of
her vote.10 2  Voters may also abstain from voting due to
dissatisfaction with the system in a broader sense.10 3 The
particular reason (or reasons) why a voter abstains is truly
known only to the individual voter; and the message conveyed
by failing to cast a formal vote can be ambiguous. 10 4 What is
certain is that abstention can involve political expression or
communication, 05 and that a number of Australians have
professed that their refusal to vote is due to disagreement or
dissatisfaction with the political process.'06
4. Reasons for Allowing the Political Expression of Not Voting
As discussed above, failure to cast a formal ballot (whether
by abstaining from voting at all or by intentionally casting an
informal ballot) can be a means of political expression. Even
under the narrow confines of Australia's implied freedom of
political communication, the political expression of not voting
should be allowed for four reasons.
First, the political expression of not voting should be
allowed because abstention from voting has political effects.
Henry J. Abraham pointed out that by intentionally not casting
1019; Jackman, supra note 17, at 418. A voter might also express apathy by casting
a "donkey vote." JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 76. Donkey votes are
formal ballots wherein the preferences are filled out in perfect sequence (e.g., '1, 2,
3, 4, 5" or "5, 4, 3, 2, 1"). Id. A donkey vote may correspond with a voter's political
choice, or it may be "a manifestation of ignorance or exasperation." Memorandum
from Tim Evans, supra note 12, at 9. Approximately two to three percent of the
total votes cast in Australian elections can be described as donkey votes. JAENSCH &
TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 76.
102. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 22. Faderson v. Bridger forecloses this as a
"valid and sufficient reason" for failure to vote. See supra note 61.
103. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (describing Michael Mansell's
refusal to vote); see also HILL, supra note 2, at 7 ("Some people have indicated that
they wish to abstain according to the rationale that elections are merely occasions to
forge consent. Others refer to prior or conflicting political commitments that would
be impugned by their voting for candidates of whom they disapprove.").
104. See Blomberg, supra note 100, at 1017 n.16. Blomberg stated that no
matter the subjective reason a registered voter may have for not voting, the message
in doing so "is clearly one of dissatisfaction with the political system." Id.
105. See id. at 1016-17.
106. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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a formal vote, a voter "figuratively lends additional votes to
those who cast ballots since, in a sense, the latter vote will have
added affirmative weight."10 7  A voter might also seek to
sacrifice her vote at the present time to gain a political effect in
the future. In his Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony
Downs described how voters might strategically abstain to keep
their party from moving toward the center: essentially, voters
allow an opposing party to win by withholding their votes
entirely. 108 Abstention can be used as a bargaining chip to keep
a party in line with the views of a group of voters. 10 9 Other
scholars suggest that voters perceive abstention as a check
against the tyranny of the majority. 10 Not voting can also
influence other participants in the political system.111 Consider
the case of Mr. Langer, 112 who was imprisoned for encouraging
others to mark their ballots in a way that would make them
likely to become exhausted votes. 13 The public controversy
surrounding Mr. Langer's actions (and the Commonwealth's
response to them) was at least one possible cause contributing to
the increase of exhausted votes" 4-- from 7,325 in 1993, to 48,979
in 1996." 5 By failing to cast a formal ballot, a would-be voter
can influence an election, other voters, and the political system
107. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 2. This author is reminded of her college
professor who, on the morning of Election Day, encouraged his students not to vote
so that his vote would have the added weight of their non-votes.
108. DOWNS, supra note 27, at 119.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Blomberg, supra note 100, at 1023 (citing JAMES M. ENELOW &
MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING: AN INTRODUCTION 90-95
(1984)).
111. Absent a compulsory voting requirement, this form of protest may prove
less effective.
112. See generally Langer v. Commw. (1996) 186 C.L.R. 302; Twomey, Free to
Choose or Compelled to Lie?, supra note 79.
113. Exhausted ballots are those that must be set aside after all the chosen
preferences are eliminated due to the system of preferential voting. See Electoral
Commission Queensland, Terms and Definitions, Virtual Tally Room Guide,
http://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/elections/state/state2006/vtr/terms.htm (last visited Nov.
16, 2006).
114. The law has changed since Langer, when "1,2,3,3,3" was a formal vote that
could become exhausted; today such a vote would be informal and not counted at all.
See supra note 70. Mr. Langer was trying to convince people to cast their votes in a
way that, while apparently legal, was not legal to persuade others to do. Under the
new law, this would be comparable to convincing others to cast informal ballots
intentionally-something a voter could do in the secrecy of the polling booth, but
that the State might punish him for advocating. See Twomey, Free to Choose or
Compelled to Lie?, supra note 79, at 203.
115. Twomey, Free to Choose or Compelled to Lie?, supra note 79, at 204.
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
in general. The fact that actual political effects arise from this
form of political communication strongly suggests that such
expression should be allowed. 116
A second reason to allow voters to abstain entirely is that
under the current system of compulsory voting, the ballots of
voters who wish to abstain117 are grouped with the ballots of
voters who intend to cast a formal vote but fail to follow the
instructions.18  Australia does not have an opportunity for
voters to choose "none of the above," other than breaking the
law. 19 There should be an electoral avenue for voters to
communicate their dissatisfaction with the system in general or
the selection of candidates on the ballot without breaking the
law by leaving a ballot bank, marking it incorrectly, or failing to
attend the polls. 120 Although other means of communicating
dissent can be effective,121 an electoral avenue allows for the
expression of an especially powerful form of political dissent.
Third, the political expression of not voting should be
allowed because political expression through abstention is
inextricably intertwined with the question of whether a
democracy is legitimate. Refusing to vote arguably attacks the
very foundation of a democratic government; abstention can be
considered "radically subversive speech," defined by Steven D.
Smith as expression that "challenges government at the core by
denying the very legitimacy of the existing legal order."1 22 This
is comparable to the view that Michael Mansell expressed
through his refusal to vote. 23 Assuming that voting is a
116. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 3 (arguing that non-voters
"constitute[] a force, however negative, to be reckoned with in the political arena").
117. Voters who wish to abstain might, for example, cast blank ballots or
intentionally spoil their ballots.
118. See Wertheimer, supra note 9, at 279.
119. Cf Blomberg, supra note 100, at 1017 n.16 ("A protest nonvoter may seek
to express his or her viewpoint by being counted among the reported percentage of
registered voters who fail to vote."); id. at 1025-26 (arguing that abstention from
voting is a choice that allows voters to express many forms of dissatisfaction that are
not expressed by casting an invalid vote).
120. See id. at 1031 (describing how non-voters can "pool [their] discontent.., to
express dissatisfaction and send a message to the political system").
121. Other means of communicating dissent might include writing to elected
officials, protesting, or utilizing the media.
122. Steven D. Smith, Radically Subversive Speech and the Authority of Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 348, 348 (1995).
123. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. Smith emphasized that such
speech entails something more extreme than "argu[ing] that the government has
erred in adopting this or another particular policy or that some discrete feature of
the existing political regime is unjust or ill-advised." Smith, supra note 122, at 348.
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cornerstone of democracy, however, the best way to preserve the
system does not lie in forcing people to vote. 124 Individuals
should be allowed to communicate dissent through non-voting.
This form of dissent, radical though it may be, should be allowed
because democracies are based not only upon the casting of
ballots, but upon the idea that citizens should constantly
examine whether the State is legitimate. The casting of ballots
is a necessary condition for a working democracy, but it is not a
sufficient one. The choice of whether or not to cast such a ballot
is also an ingredient of paramount importance to democracy,
which is fundamentally a system chosen by the people. When
the people are forced to choose democracy, it is no longer a
choice.
Fourth, the political expression of not voting should be
allowed because the current situation punishes people who can
be described as conscientious objectors.125 Australia allows for
conscientious objectors to be relieved of their duty of military
service, 126 and the CEA specifically allows for people to be
relieved of their duty to vote if such duty conflicts with religious
obligation. 127 At minimum, conscientious political objection
Instead, radically subversive speech "argues . . . that the government itself is
fundamentally illegitimate and should be repudiated or overthrown." Id. at 349.
Because Mansell did not recognize the Commonwealth's authority over him at all,
his protest of compulsory voting as a part of a system he found inherently unjust fits
within this category of radical expression. See id. at 350; Aborigine Refuses to Vote
in "White" Elections, supra note 2.
124. Cf THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 50-51
(1970) (arguing that suppression of anti-democratic groups is not a good way to
maintain democracy).
125. See HILL, supra note 2, at 7 (defining conscientious objectors as "those who
wish to be excused ... not because voting is inconvenient or boring but because of
politically principled reasons").
126. See Defence Act, 1903, § 61(A)(1)(h)-(i) (Austl.) (exempting "persons whose
conscientious beliefs do not allow them to participate in war or warlike operations"
or "a particular war or particular warlike operations"). See generally Moira Coombs
& Laura Rayner, Research Note, Conscientious Objection to Military Service in
Australia, 31 DEP'T OF THE PARLIAMENTARY LIBR. (2003), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/RN/2002-03/03rn31.pdf. Paradoxically, in light
of its history of compulsory voting, the Commonwealth of Australia has a strong
anti-conscription tradition. See HIRST, AUSTRALIA'S DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at
284 ("Australia is the only democracy in the world where there has been a strong
movement against conscription on the basis that conscription is antidemocratic.").
127. See Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, § 245(14) (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB; Australian Electoral
Commission, Electoral Backgrounder No. 17, s.pra note 67, at 3. Voting by mail is
another concession to religious duty that conflicts with attending the polls. See
JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 161.
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should be considered a "valid and sufficient reason" for failing to
vote. 128  When people are punished for "reasons that are
politically principled in nature,"129 it is a perversion of a law
that is supposed to foster democracy and freedom of political
communication. 30 The injustice is made especially clear when a
person who casts a blank ballot or intentionally spoils one
cannot possibly be caught due to the secret ballot law. It is
deeply disturbing that a person who holds fast to their belief
that voting is somehow objectionable or unjust should be
punished, while a person who writes down a vote that is a lie
has followed the law.131
5. Alternate Rationales Behind Compulsory Voting
Due to the CEA requirement that voting is to be done by
secret ballot,132 what electors actually are compelled to do is
attend the polls and place a ballot in the box.133 Furthermore,
abstainers are rarely penalized. I34 While one of the rationales
128. See HILL, supra note 2, at 8 ("[Tlhere is something troubling about
compelling people ... to participate in a political process to which they have sincere
and sustained objections; thus, a properly functioning democratic society should
seek to find some way of accommodating dissenters of this type.").
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. (noting that while a high turnout is good, "there are some people ...
who find compulsion so objectionable that it is counterproductive to try and compel
her/him to vote[,]" and the resulting punishment when these people "stand on
principle" is "bad both for the people concerned and for democracy in general"); id. at
8-9 (arguing that compulsory voting can be reconciled with allowing conscientious
objectors to abstain because (1) compulsory voting fights apathy, and conscientious
objectors are not apathetic; and (2) subjecting conscientious objectors to penalties
"can only harm the reputation of compulsory voting and ... the likely effect would
be to provoke antipathy among the electorate"); id. at 9 (stating that to ignore the
plight of conscientious objectors "is to miss the whole point of democracy").
131. See id. at 7 (acknowledging that some voters claim being forced to choose
among objectionable candidates is "tantamount to a compulsion to lie"); cf. Twomey,
Free to Choose or Compelled to Lie?, supra note 79, at 216 (arguing that compulsory
voting treats "a vote which is a lie ... as being of greater importance to the system
of representative democracy, than one which truly represents a person's political
opinion").
132. See Commonwealth Electoral Act,1918, § 233 (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA25724900llA9AB.
133. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 25, 32; BRUGGER & JAENSCH, supra note
32, at 202; supra Part I.B.ii.a.
134. Most incidents of failure to vote are resolved through penalty notices, which
notify the elector that:
(a) the elector appears to have failed to vote at the election; and (b) it is an
offence to fail to vote at an election without a valid and sufficient
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for compulsory voting-that it increases voter turnout 135-
withstands this combination of impossibility of enforcement in
some situations and lax enforcement across the board, an
examination of the politics behind compulsory voting raises the
possibility that the purpose of securing high turnout is to
advance the interests of political parties rather than the ideal of
ensuring that every elector's voice is heard. 136 Compulsory
voting was adopted in 1924 at the Commonwealth level 37 not
only to increase voter participation, but also to decrease
campaign expenses for political parties. 38 Ten years earlier,
compulsory voting was established in Queensland when the
Liberal government feared it would lose the upcoming election
to the Labor party. 39 Both parties favored compulsory voting
because it would negate the need to convince voters to attend
the polls. 140 One of the most striking incentives for present-day
politicians to support compulsory voting is financial: after
reason for the failure; and (c) if the elector does not wish to have the
apparent failure to vote dealt with by a court, the elector may, within
the prescribed time: (i) [explain that the elector did vote]; or (ii) ...
give . . . a valid and sufficient reason for the failure; or (iii) pay ... a
penalty of $20.
Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, § 245(5) (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB; see also HILL, supra note 2,
at 5; supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Punishments beyond imposing fines
are at the discretion of the court. See Legal Information Access Center, supra note
8.
135. See, e.g., WATSON & TAMI, supra note 76, at 7 (citing an estimate that
compulsory voting accounts for a difference in turnout of seven percentage points
compared to nations without it).
136. See, e.g., HIRST, AUSTRALIA'S DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at 325 (arguing
that compulsory voting has not been eliminated in Australia "because it suits the
interests of the parties"); JAENSCH & TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 51 (concluding
that "compulsory voting' is supported by both major parties primarily because such
a system is in their interests").
137. Compulsory voting was not actually applied at the Commonwealth level
until the election held the year following its adoption. See Memorandum from Tim
Evans, supra note 12, at 5; Australian Electoral Commission, Timeline: 1900-
Present, http://www.aec.gov.au/_contentlWhen/history/historyl900.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007).
138. See Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Backgrounder No. 17,
supra note 67, at 1.
139. See Legal Information Access Center, supra note 8. Labor volunteers were
very effective in getting out the vote. See id.
140. Id.; see also Frank Devine, Voluntary Voting Would Be a Legacy to Be
Proud of, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 7, 2005, at 15. The Liberal party's plan did increase
turnout, but it did so for both sides; the plan backfired, and Labor won. See Legal
Information Access Center, supra note 8.
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obtaining a threshold of four percent of the total formal votes
counted in an election, candidates are rewarded with funding
based on how many votes they received. 41 It is clearly in the
interest of a politician to support a high turnout via compulsory
voting. The interaction of the above pragmatic considerations
and political motivations behind compulsory voting raises the
possibility that it is more about ensuring a high head count than
about giving each eligible citizen a true choice.
B. POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF ABOLISHING COMPULSORY
VOTING IN AUSTRALIA
1. Decline in Turnout
The general rule is that introduction of compulsory voting
increases turnout,142 while introduction of voluntary voting
decreases it.143 Most likely, a decline in turnout will follow a
return to voluntary voting in Australia, though it is extremely
unlikely that turnout will fall to the level where "the system
collapses because no government is chosen."144 Several other
countries have abolished their compulsory voting laws145 with
results that have not been catastrophic. 46 Although turnout is
141. See Memorandum from Tim Evans, supra note 12, at 13. After meeting the
threshold percentage, the rate per formal vote is $1.95. Id. The public funding total
for the 2004 election was $41,926,158.91. Id.
142. The initial increase in turnout in Australia, for example, was thirty percent
among women and eighteen percent among men. See G. BINGHAM POWELL,
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION, STABILITY, AND VIOLENCE 114
(1982). Promulgation of sanctions against non-voters increased Costa Rica's turnout
by about fifteen percent. See WATSON & TAMI, supra note 76, at 7. In 1971,
Uruguay's turnout jumped seventeen percent upon introduction of compulsory
voting. See POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra, at 114.
143. For example, when the Netherlands ceased penalizing citizens for not
voting in 1970, turnout fell by sixteen percent. See FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 73
n.15; id. at 231; POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 114.
Venezuela removed sanctions in 1993 (but still retained compulsory voting), and
turnout dropped thirty percent. See WATSON & TAM], supra note 76, at 7, n. 19.
144. See DOWNS, supra note 27, at 261 (expounding a worst-case scenario where
turnout is zero).
145. Some nations have left the rule of compulsory voting in place but abolished
sanctions. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; supra note 124.
146. See, e.g., POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 114
(stating that voter turnout levels in the Netherlands have stabilized at about ten
percent under the country's turnout levels when voting was compulsory). Franklin
stated that the decline in turnout "incidental to the removal of compulsory voting...
will not continue beyond the number of years it takes to replace the electorate of the
countries concerned." FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 221.
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generally higher in countries with compulsory voting,147 many
democracies have high levels of turnout without compulsory
voting.148 While compulsory voting is certainly one way to yield
a high turnout, it is not necessary to do sO.149
One possible safeguard against a democracy-imperiling
plummet is Australia's system of mandatory voter
registration. 0 In most democracies, voter registration is an
affirmative obligation undertaken by the government.' 15 The
United States, notorious for low voter turnout,152 is one of only a
few democracies where registration is voluntary.. 53  However,
147. See FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 137 ("A country with compulsory voting will
see turnout more than 11 percent higher... than a country without compulsory
voting.. .. "); POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 114 (citing
a study in which "average turnout, by any measure, was about 10 percent higher in
the countries with [non-voting] penalties").
148. The democracy with the highest turnout is voluntary-voting Malta. See
FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 92; Lijphart, supra note 16, at 9-10 (pointing to Malta as
an example of "near-universal turnout without compulsory voting"). Other countries
with high turnout and voluntary voting include the United Kingdom (77%), France
(79%), Germany (87%), and New Zealand (90%). See Rex Jory, Voting Must Be a
Right, Not an Enforced Law, THE ADVERTISER, Feb. 21, 2003, at 20.
149. See Lijphart, supra note 16, at 9, 10 (listing as other important variables:
"automatic registration, a highly proportional electoral system, infrequent elections"
and "a highly politicized environment").
150. See Commonwealth Electoral Act,1918, § 101(1) (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilationl.nsf/framelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA25724900llA9AB ("[Elvery person who is
entitled to be enrolled ... and whose name is not on the Roll, shall forthwith fill in
and sign a claim and send or deliver the claim . . . ."); see also JAENSCH &
TEICHMANN, supra note 23, at 51; G. Bingham Powell, American Voter Turnout in
Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 17, 21 (1986).
151. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 88, at 17; POWELL, CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 14.
152. About two-thirds of eligible voters in the United States fail to vote. See
POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 13. However, thirty-five
to forty percent of these eligible voters are not registered, and thus are not allowed
to vote. See Deborah S. James, Note, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the
Fundamental Right to Vote, 96 YALE L. J. 1615, 1615 (1987); Mark Thomas
Quinlivan, Comment, One Person, One Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity of
Judicial Intervention in the Realm of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2361,
2363 (1989). Democracies with similar turnout rates to the United States include
India, Jamaica, Switzerland, and Turkey; democracies with the highest turnouts
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
See POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 13. Australia, on
the other hand, is a country "where virtually everyone votes." FRANKLIN, supra note
8, at 3.
153. France and Jamaica (after 1962) also rely on voters to register themselves.
See POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 114. However, in
France such registration is assisted by having a single department oversee voter
registration and mandatory citizen identity cards. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra
note 88, at 21; Powell, American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, supra
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the voting registration laws in the United States are often
blamed for low registration, and hence, low turnout. 5 4  In fact,
when U.S. voter turnout is calculated using registered voters (as
opposed to eligible ones), "the rate . . . is comparable to rates in
other democracies with more or less automatic registration
systems."1 55  According to Frances Fox Piven and Richard A.
Cloward in Why Americans Don't Vote, "once people are
registered, they overwhelmingly vote."1 56
Another safeguard against a drastic drop in turnout is a
possible social norm in favor of voting.157 One possible
explanation for Australia's high voting rate is norm-based:
[Wihen the law requires that people should vote, and specifies
penalties for failure to do so, the norm of universal participation is
generated and reinforced. People don't necessarily vote to avoid
penalties but because universal participation is the norm and it is the
norm because it is the law.158
However, a social norm's effect on turnout may be
overshadowed by political institutions and electoral law. 15 9
note 150, at 21.
154. See POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, supra note 142, at 114
(explaining that voting requires a double effort when citizens must register
themselves, affecting turnout); Halperin, supra note 25, at 17; James, supra note
152, at 1360 (noting that turnout in the United States "declined significantly as
states began to introduce personal registration requirements" in the late 1800s).
155. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 88, at 18.
156. Id. at 18. For example, eighty percent of U.S. registered voters turned out
at the polls in 1980. Id.; see also id. at 260 ("Nonvoting is almost entirely
concentrated among those who are not registered."). Furthermore, in the United
States, "[tihe number of people who get to the right voting place and attempt to vote,
but whose ballots are not counted or who are not permitted to vote in the first place,
is itself considerable." Id. at 262. Even registered voters may be turned away due to
bureaucratic snafus. Id.; see also Halperin, supra note 25, at 95. See generally
Robert S. Erikson, Why Do People Vote? Because They Are Registered, 9 AM. POL. Q.
259 (1981).
157. See WATSON & TAMI, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that "a wide range of social
and institutional factors" have a role in voter turnout); Hasen, supra note 17, at
2151 (explaining that if a norm for voting exists, it results in social sanctions, social
rewards, and self-sanctioning).
158. HILL, supra note 2, at 5; see also Hirst, Senate Occasional Lecture, supra
note 87, at 3 ("Australian voters accepted compulsion."); Matsler, supra note 13, at
963 ("Voting is now a part of Australia's social ethos."); McCarthy, supra note 24, at
5 (describing compulsory and preferential voting as "an accepted social and legal
norm in Australia").
159. See Jackman, supra note 17, at 405; see also FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 147
(declaring that "[tiurnout change is not brought about by changes in the character of
society or of its members" but "because elections change their character"); id. at 171
("[C]ommentators who see in falling turnout a reflection on the civic-mindedness of
citizens, or on their commitment to democracy, appear to be mistaken."). But see
[Vol. 16:2
COMPULSORY VOTING INAUSTRALIA
While turnout will most likely decline in the wake of the re-
establishment of voluntary voting, there are possible
institutional and societal checks upon a devastating drop. An
additional option for Australia to consider is instituting a
system of incentives to vote-substituting a "carrot" approach
for the current "stick" approach.160 Incentives for voting are not
unheard of; the government paid ancient Athenians to vote.161
As Richard Hasen explained, however, there are a few problems
with paying people to vote.16 2 In addition to the expense of such
a program, 6 3 Hasen doubted that carrots would carry the same
message of "moral authority or social consensus" that sticks
do.'6 There is also the possible line-drawing problem between
being paid to vote and being paid to vote a certain way. 65
Incentives do not have to be monetary, however. Consider the
Italian example of helping pay transportation costs for voters,166
or Kentucky's plan to post voters' names as a way to recognize
civic participation. 67  With a little creativity, perhaps an
incentives program could help protect Australia's turnout rate.
2. The Free Rider Problem
Another possible effect of abolishing compulsory voting is
that more people will be "free riders" who benefit from elections
without participating.168 However, it should be noted that under
Australia's current program of compulsory voting, the problem
Powell, American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, supra note 150, at 36
(acknowledging that while "voting is particularly influenced by institutional factors,"
attitudes of the citizenry are also relevant).
160. See Lijphart, supra note 16, at 11 ("A logical alternative to compulsory
voting is to use rewards for voting instead of penalties for nonvoting.").
161. This program was "apparently the biggest item in the budget" for Athens,
according to Hasen. Hasen, supra note 17, at 2172; see Lijphart, supra note 16, at
11.
162. Hasen, supra note 17, at 2172.
163. For example, a program that pays voters instead of selectively prosecuting
non-voters. See id.
164. Id.
165. For more on arguments that voluntary voting may increase voter fraud, see
infra note 180 and accompanying text.
166. See Ivor Crewe, Electoral Participation, in DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPETITIVE NATIONAL ELECTIONS 216, 241 (David Butler
et al. eds., 1981) ("Italy makes generous concessions on train fares available to those
who have to return to their home constituency to vote.").
167. See Richard Wilson, State Elections Board Will Distribute Lists of Those
Who Voted, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 25, 1995, at B2.
168. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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of free riders is not solved because voters may spoil their
ballots. 169 Such voters fail to cast valid ballots, but gain the
benefits of the election. Furthermore, the free rider problem is
not fatal to voluntary voting; instead, it is countered by the
democratic agreement to abide by the laws, even when one does
not agree with them, and even when one chooses not to vote for
the representatives that make them.170  As Alexander
Meiklejohn elucidated: "At the bottom of every plan of self-
government is a basic agreement ... that all matters of public
policy shall be decided by corporate action, that such decisions
shall be equally binding on all citizens, whether they agree with
them or not."171 Making voting voluntary will not change the
underlying plan of self-government that Meiklejohn described;
those who choose not to vote will still be bound by the laws
made on behalf of the electorate.172
It could also be argued that compulsory voting merely adds
an immediate fiscal cost to failure or refusal to fulfill one's civic
duty to more theoretical costs that may not be incurred in such
a timely manner. 173 The response to this argument is that while
the government uses the threat of fines and possible
imprisonment to persuade people to vote, the secret ballot
provision of Australia's electoral law 14 means that no person
can be forced to cast a formal vote.175 As it is within the bounds
of the law for a person intentionally to cast an informal ballot,
such a person is obtaining the benefits of an election without
paying his civic due-he is a free rider, just like a person who
refrains from attending the polls at all. The free rider problem
is therefore not solved by compulsory voting in Australia.
169. See supra Part I.B.ii.a.
170. A system of objective balancing is outside the scope of this Note.
171. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 9. Meiklejohn noted that "[plolitical
freedom does not mean freedom from control," but rather "self-control". Not
everyone will agree with decisions the government makes, but such decisions are
binding. Id.
172. See VERBA, NIE & KIM, supra note 19, at 53 (noting that voting's "scope of..
outcome is very broad, affecting all citizens").
173. Cf DOWNS, supra note 27, at 36-37 (discussing benefits voters derive from
government and suggesting that abstention may mean that such benefits are not
gained by the populace).
174. See Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918, § 233 (Austl.),
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsflframelodgment
attachments/E8DOAFD85E700F53CA2572490011A9AB; supra notes 61, 130.
175. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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3. Speculative Changes to the Workings of Political Parties
Many things about elections and politics are likely to
remain the same even with a change to voluntary voting. For
example, making voting voluntary would probably not favor
either of the major parties in Australia. 176 While compulsory
voting has several positive political aspects to it,177 there are
countering negative aspects that could be alleviated by the
institution of voluntary voting. Voluntary voting will probably
not make it as easy as compulsory voting does for parties to
identify marginal electorates. It may force politicians to
broaden the scope of their efforts to convince voters to elect
them.178 The argument that voluntary voting would lead to an
increase in corrupt practices surrounding elections 179  is
mitigated by the fact that Australia has many laws (with far
harsher penalties than failing to vote) to deter and punish
electoral offenses.180
CONCLUSION
The problem of compulsory voting is deeply important to the
meaning of democratic government. Australia's system of
compulsory voting should be abolished, but a few caveats should
be stressed. The first is that different individuals and different
nations will come to different conclusions about this issue. Over
30 countries have a program compelling their citizens to vote;
others make voting a voluntary exercise of a right. This Note
takes the view that allowing conscientious objectors to express
176. See Memorandum from Tim Evans, supra note 12, at 14 (mentioning that
"there is no empirical evidence" that such a shift would give a major party an edge
over another). But see Phillip Coorey, Libs Seek Voluntary Vote, THE ADVERTISER,
Apr. 27, 2005, at 28 (containing statement of a politician's belief that conservatives
would benefit disproportionately from voluntary voting).
177. See supra Part I.A.
178. See Australian Electoral Commission, Compulsory Voting, supra note 18;
BRUGGER & JAENSCH, supra note 32, at 203; Memorandum from Tim Evans, supra
note 12, at 10; Counterpoint: Compulsory Voting, supra note 7 (containing statement
of Bill Smithies that compulsory voting allows parties to "factor out uncertainty" as
to voter turnout, leading to unbalanced concentration on marginal electorates); id.
(containing statement of Senator Nick Minchin that this tendency of compulsory
voting "adds to the paucity of the political process" in Australia).
179. See, e.g., Coorey, supra note 176.
180. See Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Offences,
http://www.aec.gov.au/_content/How/procedures/offences.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2007). For example, attempting to influence another person's vote through bribery
can be punished by two years in prison, a $5,000 fine, or both. Id.
2007]
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political dissent outweighs a high voter turnout. With a
different baseline assumption, the analysis may have gone very
differently. A second consideration is the secret ballot provision
of Australian electoral law.'8 ' The requirement that voting be
done in secret is what makes Australia's compulsory voting
program even remotely defensible. Its power means that
compulsory voting can only be enforced through the proxy of
compelled attendance at the polls. The presence of this
provision, and minimal enforcement of the duty to vote, may
abrogate the offensiveness of compulsory voting, but voluntary
voting is a much stronger option for democracy. As new
democratic governments are created, and older ones strive to
reach greater and more meaningful citizen participation, it is
important to remember that democracies are created and
maintained by the consent of the governed, and that voting is
the means by which the will of the people is harnessed. The
right to vote is the right to make a political choice; for some,
refusal to cast a valid ballot is a form of sincere political
expression. At a fundamental level, democracy ceases when
people are forced to choose it. Voluntary voting should be
restored to Australia because, while the act of voting is
important, it does matter whom one votes for.
181. See supra note 62.
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